英语翻译高分求助

[Table 6 goes about here]
Table 7 reports regressions in which the sample is restricted to those corporations that are
group-affiliated or to those that are non-affiliated; in each case, both the 20 percent and the 10
percent levels of control are considered. These regressions confirm that the 20 percent level of
control in groups is a significant threshhold for insider expropriation. For corporations affiliated
to a group at the 20 percent level, there is a significant negative relationship between O/C and
dividends as a ratio of cash flows and also as a ratio of earnings. This reinforces the indications in
Table 6A that, within groups that are tightly controlled at the 20 percent level, corporate
managers must pay higher dividends to offset greater investor concerns about expropriation when
the O/C ratio is lower. By contrast, for corporations not affiliated to a group at the 20 percent
level, Table 7 shows that there is a significantly positive relationship between O/C and dividends
as a ratio of market capitalization and also as a ratio of sales. Thus, investors seem less alert to
expropriation in such corporations, giving insiders latitude to pay lower dividends when there is
greater discrepancy between their ownership and control stakes. However, these significantly
20
positive relationships between O/C and dividends disappear if the sample is restricted to
corporations that are not affiliated to a group at the 10 percent level.
The findings reported in the last paragraph have an interesting implication. Partition the
set of corporations that are not affiliated at the 20 percent level into two subsets: (a) those that are
not affiliated at the 10 percent level; (b) those that are affiliated at the 10 percent level but not at
the 20 percent level. We saw that subsets (a) and (b) taken together exhibited a significantly
positive relationship between O/C and dividends as a ratio of market capitalization and also as a
ratio of sales. We also saw that subset (a) fails to exhibit any significantly positive relationship
between the O/C ratio and these dividend rates. It follows that the significantly positive
relationship between the O/C ratio and these dividend rates for corporations that are not affiliated
at the 20 percent level was due mainly to subset (b), i.e., to loosely-affiliated corporations. 19
To summarize: investors appear alert to expropriation within groups with tight control
linkages at the highly-visible 20 percent level, as evidenced by the higher dividends paid by
group-affiliated corporations with a greater discrepancy between ownership and control rights.

表7回归分析报告，其中样本仅限于这些公司都
集团下属或者是那些同时也是无党籍，在每种情况下，无论是20 ％和10
％程度的管制，是考虑。这些回归分析证实， 20 ％的水平，
控制群体是一个很大的门槛内幕征用。公司下属
一组在20 ％的水平，有一个显着的负关系的O / C和
作为分红的比例，现金流量，也作为一个比例的收入。这更加剧了该适应症
表6 ，在有些组织要紧紧控制在百分之二十的水平，公司
管理者必须支付更高的股息，以抵消更多的投资者的关注，征用时
澳/容车量比率较低。相比之下，对于企业，不属一组在20 ％
水平，表7显示，有一个显着的正相关关系的O / C和股息
作为一个比例的市值，也作为一个比例的销售。因此，投资者似乎不那么警觉
征用，在这种公司，让内行人纬度支付较低的股利时，有
更大的差距，其所有权和控制权的赌注。然而，这些显着
20
正面关系的O / C和红利消失，如果样本是限于
公司认为，不属于一组在百分之十的水平。
报告评估结果在最后一段中有一个有趣的含义。分割
一套公司表示，不附属于20 ％的水平分成两个子： （一）那些有
不附属于10 ％的水平; （二）是那些同时也是附属于10 ％的水平，而不是在
百分之二十的水平。我们看到子（一）及（二）一并呈现显着
正面关系的O / C和股息的比率市值，也作为一个
比例的销售。我们还看到，子集（一）没有展出任何显着正相关
之间的O / C比值与这些股息率。这意味着显着的正
关系的O / C比值与这些股息率的公司，不属于
在20 ％的水平，主要是由于子（二） ，即以松散的联营公司。 19
总结：投资者似乎警觉征用群体与严格控制
联系，在高度可视性20 ％的水平，从而显示了较高支付的股息
集团下属公司与大的差距，所有权与控制权

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