·请各位高手快来帮忙,把这些英语翻译成汉语.一定要通顺啊!着急啊!哈哈!
Whether a trade restraint was ancillary depended on whether the cov-
enant was subordinate to the transaction’s main lawful purpose, or w-
as the object of the contract and therefore a “naked covenant not to
compete.” As later decisions explained, the interests of the parties and
the public were to be protected. The courts , therefore, inquired: For
what purpose was the restraint imposed? What was the agreement’s effect?
(Could the promisor readily practice his trade elsewhere-and could the
Public receive the benefit of his competition somewhere?) Not surpris-
Ingly, restrictive covenants in employment contracts were scrutinized
more closely than covenants connected to a sale of a business. As courts
became more sophisticated they also asked whether the lawful objective
could be obtained in some less restrictive way. (Was it necessary to bind
an employee’s right to his trade in order to protect business secrets?)
As the philosophy of laissez faire grew more firmly entrenched, first
suggested that the parties themselves could best judge what was reas-
onable, a doctrine familiar to students of contract law (and the pep-
percorn theory of consideration). It followed, then, that courts could
presume that the terms were reasonable and not against the public in-
terest; this presumption became conclusive when courts refused to admit
contrary evidence of market condition. Ultimately the exceptions engulfed
the rule, at least in England, where price-fixing agreements often
withstood challenge by victims of such arrangements, and the House of
Lords went so far as to uphold a worldwide covenant not to compete. C-
Ompare Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co. (1894) (e-
nforcing ancillary restraint that barred seller of an arms-manufacturing
business from competing with the purchaser anywhere in the world for 25
years) with Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor Gow & Co. (1891) (refusing
to ban agreement by loose combination of steamship companies to set p-
redatory would be void at common law as contrary to “public policy” a-
nd unenforceable among the parties to it); see also Tony Freyer, Reg-
ulating Big Business- Antitrust in Great Britain and America 1880-1990,
at 121-32 (1992); Donald Dewey, The Common Law Background of Antitrust
Policy, 41 Va. L. Rev. 759 (1955).
The “common law” was somewhat less receptive to trade restraints
in the United States. One line of decisions banned price-fixing agreements
and other anticompetitive arrangements when the challenged affected an
article of “prime necessity.” See Richardson v. Buhl (1889). A related
branch of rulings dispensed with the distinction between essential and
non-essential items and prohibited naked trade restraints dealing with
commodities and services other than matters of prime necessity.
是否是下级到交易的主要合法的目的，或者w-
作为合同的对象并且“赤裸契约
不竞争”。 因为以后决定解释的，党的兴趣和
公众将被保护。 法院，因此，询问了： 为
什么目的克制被强加了？ 什么是协议的作用？
(欣然可能promisor实践他的贸易在别处和可能
公众接受他的竞争的好处某处？) 没有surpris-
Ingly，限制性契约在就业合同比
契约严密未被详细检查连接到事务的销售。 当法院
变得更加老练他们也问合法的宗旨是否
可能得到用某一较不限制性方式。 (Was it necessary to bind
an employee’s right to his trade in order to protect business secrets?)
As the philosophy of laissez faire grew more fi
