急!跪求高人翻译下面文字(中译英),在线等```

These estimates allow us to quantify the relative weights placed on “special interests” and general economic welfare. In striking contrast to Goldberg and Maggi’s (1997) results with U.S.data, we find quantitative evidence that Chinese provincial and central governments have given much greater weight to the special interests of state-owned enterprises than to general economic welfare. Moreover, our empirical framework allows us to estimate how the weights in the government’s objective function have shifted over time. In other words, we can quantify the extent to which Chinese political economy has become more “market-oriented” over the course of the reform period. Finally, our framework allows us to estimate the impact on governmental utility of proposed changes in China’s trade regime. As an experiment, we estimate the impact of the tariff reductions China has offered as part of its bid for WTO accession. The implications of these findings for the political economy literature and for the debate over economic reform in China are discussed in the conclusion. The proofs of propositions are gathered in a separate Appendix.
怎么都是机翻的```晕啊